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Abstract
This paper examines the link between risk and institutional quality, an
unresolved issue in finance. Our hypothesis is that institutions affect risk
through extreme events and not through volatility. We focus on relative
tail risk with an original approach that is able to estimate historical tail
risk with greater precision. Using international stock market data, we
show that tail risk is stable over time, unlike volatility. We find that tail
risk captures the relation between risk and institutional quality better than
volatility. Better governance substantially reduces the probability of
extreme events.
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1. Introduction 
The link between a country’s institutional environment and its economic activity is firmly 
established, but the question of the mechanisms of transmission is still open to alternative 
interpretations (Spolaore and Wacziarg 2013). Following Ramey and Ramey (1995), many 
researchers empirically established that risk is detrimental to growth at least in a cross-country 
setting. Then, a natural way to investigate the question of how institutions affect economic 
outcomes is through the effect of institutions on risk. In that respect, a large body of literature has 
examined the relation between institutional framework and volatility-based risk measures. 
However, this stream of research has not delivered conclusive results so far and offers 
contradictory outcomes. In this paper, we assess the distribution of extreme risk across the cross-
section of international stock markets and revisit the debate over institutions and risk by exploring 
a new channel that could provide the missing link between a country’s institutional quality and its 
economic outcomes—namely, tail risk. 
The existing research on the nature of the relation between institutional qualities and risk, 
uses volatility or volatility-based risk measures. On the one hand, Johnson et al. (2000), Morck et 
al. (2000), Acemoglu et al. (2003), Jin and Myers (2006) and Hutton et al. (2009) broadly find that 
better institutions and transparency are associated with low levels for the volatility-based risk 
measures. On the other hand, Dasgupta et al. (2010), Griffin et al. (2010), and Bartram et al. (2012) 
find either no relation or an opposite relation between these characteristics. This might be because 
of the fluctuating and time-varying nature of volatility, as observed in Bekaert and Harvey (1997), 
which is difficult to reconcile with the enduring pervasiveness of institutions (Glaeser et al., 2004; 
La Porta et al., 2008). Following on Acemoglu et al. (2017) who show that aggregate volatility 
and macroeconomic tail risks differ in nature, we investigate whether tail risk is a better candidate 
than volatility for linking risk and durable institutional characteristics.  
First, we investigate the stability of tail risk and volatility over the period 1994-2014. Our 
results show that the tail indices have remained stable over this period, but we reject the hypothesis 
of stability in volatility for 80% of countries. This suggests that the slow varying structural factors 
related to institutional quality are more likely to reflect through tail risk than volatility. 
Furthermore, we also find that tail risk is orthogonal to volatility in the cross section, revealing 
that the two measures capture different aspects of country risk. We extend the emerging stream of 
literature, including Gabaix (2008), Kelly and Jiang (2014) and Acemoglu et al. (2017), on the 
importance of tail risk in economics and finance by showing that it has different informational 
content from volatility as a measure of risk at a country level. Our methodology complements 
Straetmans and Candelon (2013), and Ibragimov et al. (2013) by using a more precise tail index 
estimator, and extends their work by using a larger sample of countries. 
Second, we study the cross-sectional determinants of tail risk and volatility, respectively. 
Our results suggest that tail risk is a better link between institutions and risk than volatility. We 
find a strong empirical relation between tail risk and institutional quality even after accounting for 
economic and financial variables. Better governance substantially reduces the probability of 
extreme events. In contrast, the link between institutions and volatility is not as strong. Thus, this 
together with our earlier finding indicates that country equity market volatility may not have the 
capacity to measure deep structural economic risks arising from the nature and quality of 
institutions across countries. Our results offer an alternative perspective to that of Johnson et al. 
  
(2000), Acemoglu et al. (2003), and Malik and Temple (2009), who focus on the link between 
volatility and institutions.  
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the empirical model, the methods for 
estimating tail risk and the data. Section 3 presents the results and Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Methods and data 
2.1. Empirical model and sample construction 
To test the effect of institutional quality on respectively tail risk and volatility, we estimate 
the following cross-sectional model: 
 =  + 
 +  +                 (1) 
where  is the risk level of stock market i, alternatively measured by its tail risk or its volatility. 
	is the institutional quality variable of country i,  is the vector of control 
variables of country i, and  is the error term.   
Our initial data set contains daily returns for all stock market indexes across the world that 
are consistently available in the Bloomberg database since 1994. We retain this starting date to 
obtain a sufficient number of markets and daily observations per market, especially among 
emerging countries. If several indexes are available for one country, we retain the index with the 
highest number of observations. Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States have several 
indexes with the same number of observations, so we keep the most comprehensive index for each 
of these countries (respectively the Topix, FTSE all-share, and S&P 500 indexes). We keep all 
available countries and only drop stock markets with fewer than 500 observations. This constitutes 
an initial sample of 89 countries.  
2.2. Estimating the tail exponents 
Estimating tail risk is an arduous task. Several methods exist for estimating the tail 
exponent, starting with methods such as the log-log linear regression and the Hill estimator (Hill 
1975) as well as more recent techniques based on wavelet analysis (Chen et al. 2018)1. 
Unfortunately, they are all very sensitive to the number of observations and require very large 
dataset for obtaining precise estimates. This raises concerns on the validity of these estimates and 
makes their use difficult in practice. To address this measurement issue, we take advantage of the 
fact that we are only interested in the relative ranking and magnitude of the tail risk across 
countries, and are not concerned by the absolute value of the tail index. Therefore, we can rely on 
other tools for estimating the relative tail risk. For that, we alternatively assume that returns follow 
a stable distribution in their tails and estimate the indices with the McCulloch (1986) method 
instead of using the traditional Hill’s (1975) estimator. Through a Monte Carlo simulation, we 
establish that the McCulloch estimator is much more precise than the traditional Hill estimator at 
estimating relative tail risk (see Appendix A). The mathematical justification for this approach is 
based on the result that non-Gaussian stable laws asymptotically converge to power laws in the 
                                                          
1 Sun et al. (2009) use Levy processes to compute Value at Risk using high frequency data. 
  
tail, and the approximation seems justified in our case, as our focus is on the cross-sectional 
variation of the tail indices rather than the precise estimation of individual tail exponents.  
As our aim is to understand the difference in tail risk across countries, we focus on the 
country-specific tail risk. We remove systematic or common factors from the country stock market 
returns and isolate the country-specific components of the tail index. From the various global risk 
factors presented in the literature of international asset pricing models, we consider the world 
market portfolio in our study as the common factor. Recognizing the particular exposure of 
emerging markets to the price of natural resources, we also follow Harvey (1995) and take into 
account three additional world risk factors that capture the major part of commodity markets. We 
regress the country stock market returns on the Bloomberg Energy index, the Bloomberg Precious 
Metals index, the Bloomberg Industrial Metals index, the Bloomberg Agriculture index, and the 
MSCI All Countries World index. We then use the residuals from this regression to estimate 
country-specific tail risk2. 
A lower tail index means fatter tails and, consequently, more tail risk. To make the reading 
of the tables more intuitive, we define the tail risk coefficient as the negative of the tail index. 
Then, we perform cross-section regressions using the estimates of the tail risk coefficients as 
dependent variables on our set of explanatory variables. Table 1 presents the tail risk estimates and 
the volatility over the period 1994-2014. 
Table 1. Tail risk and volatility. 
This table reports the tail risk estimates and the volatility estimates over the period 1994-2014. 
Country name Tail risk Volatility  Country name Tail risk   Volatility  Country name Tail risk Volatility 
Argentina -1.46 0.019  India -1.57 0.014  Philippines -1.61 0.014 
Australia -1.69 0.009  Indonesia -1.48 0.015  Poland -1.46 0.015 
Austria -1.7 0.011  Ireland -1.61 0.011  Portugal -1.58 0.009 
Bahrain -1.42 0.006  Israel -1.59 0.012  Qatar -1.17 0.016 
Bangladesh -1.18 0.014  Italy -1.52 0.010  Romania -1.46 0.017 
Belgium -1.63 0.009  Ivory Coast -1.27 0.008  Russia -1.45 0.023 
Botswana -1.01 0.006  Kazakhstan -1.12 0.026  Saudi Arabia -1.33 0.011 
Brazil -1.61 0.020  Kenya -1.46 0.009  Singapore -1.57 0.010 
Bulgaria -1.36 0.016  Korea, South -1.44 0.016  Slovakia -1.2 0.015 
Canada -1.7 0.007  Kuwait -1.47 0.009  Slovenia -1.42 0.012 
Chile -1.74 0.007  Laos -1.34 0.013  South Africa -1.64 0.010 
China -1.46 0.019  Latvia -1.46 0.010  Spain -1.66 0.010 
Colombia -1.49 0.013  Lebanon -1.21 0.011  Sweden -1.61 0.011 
Costa Rica -0.68 0.018  Malaysia -1.39 0.012  Switzerland -1.63 0.009 
Croatia -1.45 0.011  Malta -1.26 0.009  Taiwan -1.51 0.013 
Cyprus -1.45 0.022  Mauritius -1.35 0.008  Tanzania -1.02 0.007 
Czech Republic -1.59 0.012  Mexico -1.53 0.012  Thailand -1.46 0.015 
Denmark -1.69 0.010  Mongolia -1.07 0.044  Trinidad and Tobago -1.12 0.003 
                                                          
2 Five countries display tail indices below one, implying distributions with infinite means, which is not reliable. To 
deal with these measurement issues, we only consider McCulloch tail indices above one. 
  
Country name Tail risk Volatility  Country name Tail risk   Volatility  Country name Tail risk Volatility 
Ecuador -0.5 0.014  Morocco -1.42 0.007  Tunisia -1.61 0.006 
Egypt -1.47 0.014  Namibia -1.71 0.012  Turkey -1.47 0.024 
Estonia -1.32 0.014  Netherlands -1.56 0.009  Ukraine -1.35 0.020 
Finland -1.47 0.015  New Zealand -1.69 0.011  United Arab Emirates -1.47 0.017 
France -1.67 0.009  Nigeria -1.39 0.010  United Kingdom -1.7 0.007 
Germany -1.61 0.010  Norway -1.67 0.011  United States -1.55 0.006 
Ghana -0.75 0.010  Oman -1.2 0.009  Venezuela -1.34 0.017 
Greece -1.55 0.016  Pakistan -1.38 0.015  Vietnam -1.46 0.015 
Hong Kong -1.47 0.015  Palestine -1.17 0.013  Zambia -0.98 0.013 
Hungary -1.66 0.015  Panama -0.97 0.006     
Iceland -1.44 0.010  Peru -1.53 0.012     
 
2.3. Explanatory variables 
These are of two types of explanatory variables: those that deal with the economic and 
financial environment and those that deal with the quality of institutions. The first group of 
variables can be interpreted as barriers that lead to differences in stock market returns.  
As Glaeser et al. (2004) note, when countries become richer, they are likely to improve 
their institutions. We therefore control for the log of GDP per capita in all regressions. In addition, 
countries with less developed financial systems tend to have larger market-wide fluctuations. 
Higher stock market synchronicity is a possible reason for these fluctuations (Morck et al., 2000). 
Weak financial development can also represent a barrier to market integration and explain cross-
sectional variations in tail risk. Consequently, we use market capitalization as a percentage of GDP 
and stocks traded as a percentage of GDP to capture the degree of stock market development. 
Infrequent trading and insufficient liquidity are other sources of possible wide fluctuations. Stocks 
traded as a percentage of market capitalization (stock turnover ratio) control for the activity and 
liquidity of the market. These three variables provide information about the maturity of the 
financial system. All else being equal, we expect that more mature markets function more smoothly 
and have a lower tail risk. Finally, we take the log of number of stocks to control for the higher 
diversification of larger markets due to the law of large numbers.  
We also include the trade-to-GDP ratio, which controls for the country's economic 
openness. External shocks can generate additional risk, and more opened countries could have a 
higher tail risk. Last, we consider financial openness and use the Chinn and Ito (2008) index. 
Financial liberalization could improve international risk sharing and help reduce tail risk. 
Conversely, it could provoke abrupt capital movements and increase extreme risk.  
We are concerned with the dynamic aspects of institutional structure and the enduring set 
of meta-institutions rather than the changing set of economic institutions. Measuring the quality of 
this institutional framework is challenging, and many studies have relied on expert opinions or 
polls to estimate institutional quality. However, these subjective indicators are prone to 
measurement errors and represent an outcome of the country’s situation more than its intrinsic 
features (Glaeser et al. 2004). To circumvent this difficulty, we rely on a more objective de jure 
measures of institutional quality. We use the polity IV “constraints on executive” variable from 
  
Marshall et al. (2015). However, even though this indicator theoretically offer better measures of 
the quality of institutions, it may not give a reliable picture of the institutional environment, if not 
actually and properly enforced. Addressing this problem, Chong et al. (2014) developed an 
indicator based on the quality of the universal postal service across 159 countries. They show that 
this measure represents an objective and actual proxy for measuring government efficiency. We 
retain this indicator as an objective measure of institutional quality. Finally, we also consider 
Kaufmann et al.’s (2010; hereinafter KKM) government effectiveness indicator as subjective 
measures of institutional quality. 
Table 2 gives the summary statistics. Table B.1 in the appendix gives the sources of the 
variables. 
Table 2. Summary statistics for tail risk, economic and financial variables, and institutional 
quality variables.  
This table reports summary statistics for risk dependent variables (panel A), economic and financial variables 
(panel B), and objective and subjective institutional quality variables (panels C and D). All variables are defined in 













Panel A: Risk 
Tail risk 89  -1.37 0.23 -1.66 -0.5 
Volatility 89 0.012 0.005 0.003 0.044 
Panel B: Economic and financial variables 
Log GDP per capita 88 9.14 1.32 6.36 11.33 
Log trade to GDP 87 4.36 0.51 3.13 5.93 
Financial openness 87 0.94 1.34 -1.34 2.44 
Log number of listed stocks 86 5.12 1.49 2.14 8.72 
Log stock turnover 86 3.35 1.19 0.87 5.36 
Log market capitalization to GDP 86 3.6 0.92 1.54 5.89 
Log stocks traded to GDP 86 2.31 1.87 -1.98 5.69 
Panel C: Objective measures of institutional quality 
Postal service efficiency 87 0.7 0.3 0 1 
Executive Constraints  85 5.6 1.73 1 7 
Panel D: Subjective measures of institutional quality 
Government effectiveness  88 0.53 0.89 -1.02 2.13 
 
3. Results 
3.1. Tail risk versus volatility risk 
Many of the countries in our sample experienced significant financial liberalization in the 
course of the sample period. This may have had an effect on the evolution of risk over time, and 
we analyze the time variation of respectively volatility risk and tail risk, alongside with the time 
variation of institutions over the two sub-periods 1994–2003 and 2004–2014. We test the stability 
  
of tail risk using Phillips and Loretan’s (1990) structural change procedure. For volatility risk, we 
use Levene’s test, which is robust to departure from normality. In order to reduce the risk that our 
results be driven by a lack of power of the tests, we retain a significance criterion of 20%. Results 
are presented in Table 3. 
The hypothesis of tail index stability cannot be rejected at this large 20% level for 81% of 
the countries and for most countries, p-values are well above that threshold. Thus, we can conclude 
with some confidence that tail risk remained stable during our sample period even though there 
was substantial transformation in emerging stock markets at that time. This is in line with 
Straetmans and Candelon (2013), who empirically test for structural changes in extreme risk on a 
large set of asset classes across various international markets and do not detect any breaks except 
for a few emerging currency tails. Focusing on foreign exchange markets, Ibragimov et al. (2013) 
find similar results. This suggests that long horizon tail risk, while potentially time-variant, 
exhibits slow variation and is likely to be related to deeper structural factors. We also test the 
stability of the institutional quality over the sub-periods 1994–2003 and 2004–2014 using the 
executive constraints variable as objective measure of the institutions. As for tail risk, we find that 
almost eighty percent of countries exhibit a stable institutional environment at the large threshold 
of twenty percent.  
Conversely, stock market volatility exhibited considerable variability during our sample 
period. We reject the hypothesis of equality of historical standard deviation between 1994–2003 
and 2004–2014 at the conservative level of 1% level for 80% of the countries in our sample. For 
most countries, stock market volatility in the 2000s differed markedly from the volatility of the 
1990s. This result is in line with the extensive body of literature that deals with the long-term 
dynamics of equity volatility. For emerging countries, this result can be partly due to capital market 
liberalization and the subsequent market integration (Bekaert and Harvey 1997). It can also explain 
why Acemoglu et al. (2003), who find a robust relation between the quality of institution and the 
standard deviation of GDP per capita over a 27-year period (1970–1997), cannot replicate these 
results over the 10-year period of the 1990s. 
  
  
Table 3. Test of equality across time: 1994–2003 versus 2004–2014. 
This table reports the p-values of the test for the equality across time of respectively the tail risk based on the 
Phillips and Loretan’s (1990) test of equality of tail index, the variance based on the Levene test of equal variance 
and the institutional quality based on the t test. Institutional quality is measured by the executive constraints 
variable. Fourteen countries have not enough observations for estimating the tail index during the 1994–2003 
period, and are not reported here. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 P-values   P-values 
Country Tail risk Variance Institutional 
quality 
 Country Tail risk Variance Institutional 
quality 
Argentina 0.920 0.000*** 0.007***  Mauritius 0.688 0.000***  1.000 
Australia 0.049** 0.000***  1.000  Mexico 0.944 0.000*** 0.022** 
Austria 0.912 0.010***  1.000  Mongolia 0.597 0.000***  1.000 
Belgium 0.495 0.000***  1.000  Morocco 0.149 0.000*** 0.017** 
Brazil 0.449 0.000***  1.000  Netherlands 0.777 0.000***  1.000 
Bulgaria 0.315 0.000***  1.000  New Zealand 0.967 0.000***  1.000 
Canada 0.857 0.407  1.000  Nigeria 0.737 0.000*** N/A 
Chile 0.416 0.000***  1.000  Norway 0.667 0.598  1.000 
China 0.498 0.000***  1.000  Oman 0.545 0.000***  1.000 
Colombia 0.938 0.580 0.343  Pakistan 0.212 0.000*** 0.520 
Costa Rica 0.364 0.074*  1.000  Panama 0.700 0.001***  1.000 
Cyprus 0.185 0.004***  1.000  Peru 0.269 0.329 N/A 
Czech Republic 0.508 0.048**  1.000  Philippines 0.491 0.000***  1.000 
Denmark 0.750 0.004***  1.000  Poland 0.392 0.000*** 0.343 
Ecuador 0.042** 0.000*** 0.000***  Portugal 0.926 0.178  1.000 
Egypt 0.058* 0.000*** N/A  Qatar 0.110 0.760  1.000 
Finland 0.331 0.000***  1.000  Romania 1.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 
France 0.607 0.000***  1.000  Russia 0.984 0.000*** 0.224 
Germany 0.513 0.000***  1.000  Saudi Arabia 0.002*** 0.000***  1.000 
Greece 0.874 0.023**  1.000  Singapore 0.577 0.000***  1.000 
Hong Kong 0.681 0.000*** N/A  Slovakia 0.252 0.000*** 0.036** 
Hungary 0.490 0.002***  1.000  Slovenia 0.671 0.000***  1.000 
Iceland 0.808 0.000*** N/A  South Africa 0.666 0.001***  1.000 
India 0.391 0.000***  1.000  Spain 0.389 0.000***  1.000 
Indonesia 0.143 0.000*** 0.010**  Sri Lanka 0.294 0.140 0.031** 
Ireland 0.463 0.000***  1.000  Sweden 0.483 0.000***  1.000 
Israel 0.129 0.000***  1.000  Switzerland 0.842 0.000***  1.000 
Italy 0.347 0.000***  1.000  Taiwan 0.746 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Jamaica 0.385 0.000***  1.000  Thailand 0.592 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Japan 0.692 0.000***  1.000  Trinidad Tobago 0.740 0.000***  1.000 
Jordan 0.000*** 0.000***  1.000  Tunisia 0.973 0.662 N/A 
Kazakhstan 0.002*** 0.038** 0.343  Turkey 0.231 0.000*** 0.166 
Kenya 0.411 0.001*** 0.000***  Ukraine 0.726 0.000*** 0.039** 
Korea, South 0.243 0.000***  1.000  United Kingdom 0.390 0.000***  1.000 
Latvia 0.506 0.488  1.000  United States 0.053* 0.472  1.000 
Lebanon 0.769 0.000*** N/A  Venezuela 0.077* 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Malaysia 0.603 0.000*** 0.003***  Zambia 0.196 0.000***  1.000 
Malta 0.807 0.000*** N/A         
 
  
Figure 1 shows the scatter plots between the tail risk estimates and volatility estimates over 
the full sample period for the countries in our sample and excluding the outliers3. The R-square 
for these scatter plots is 5%, suggesting that in a cross-sectional setting, volatility and tail risk are 
orthogonal to each other, thus indicating that tail risk is quite distinct from volatility. This empirical 
finding provides further justification for our cross-sectional analysis of tail risk on its own. Taken 
together, these findings show that the behavior of tail risk is very different from that of volatility 
in our sample period. This result conforms to Acemoglu et al. (2017) who show that aggregate 
volatility and macroeconomic tail risks differ in nature. Our findings on the orthogonality of tail 
risk and volatility and the higher persistence of tail risk are in line with those of Bollerslev and 
Todorov (2011) who also find that tail risk is compensated differently from variance. The time-
varying measure of volatility is not the same in nature as deep structural factors that drive 
institutions. The latter conform better to the more stable nature of tail risk, which manifests 
occasionally through extreme events.  
Fig. 1. Scatter plots for the tail risk estimates and the volatility estimates 
 
3.2. Cross-sectional determinants of tail risk 
We use a cross-sectional regression because the tail risk estimate, which is the dependent 
variable, requires observations gathered over a long time horizon and because some variables do 
not vary much over time. In estimating eq. (1), it is possible that our institutional variables are 
endogenous due to either a problem of omitted variables or model misspecification. Endogeneity 
could also be caused by a problem of simultaneity, if the quality of the institutions is jointly 
determined with extreme risks, or reverse causality, if countries more prone to extreme events 
adopted certain types of institutions. Finally, it could arise from measurement errors because of 
the difficulty in precisely estimating institutional quality. We address these issues by implementing 
an instrumental variable (IV) technique. In our case, we have two sets of institutional measures 
that are potentially endogenous: objective and subjective. The source of their endogeneity certainly 
differs between the two sets, particularly because the subjective KKM variable may be more 
exposed to measurement errors. Therefore, we do not use the same instruments for objective and 
subjective measures of institutions.  
                                                          
3 Based on the Cook’s distance cut-off of 4/n, we identified Botswana, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Tanzania and 
Trinidad and Tobago as outliers. 
  
Although the debate about the respective influence of geographic endowments versus 
human capital on economic growth is not yet settled, the literature shows a relation between these 
factors and the institutional quality of a country, either direct or indirect. We borrow from this 
literature to find IVs that satisfy the conditions of being highly related to the objective measures 
of institutional quality and satisfying the exclusion restriction. The geographic size of a country is 
the first potential instrument that we consider. Following Olsson and Hanson (2011), we argue that 
the larger a country, the more difficult it is to implement good institutions equally over the total 
area of the country. The second instrument that we retain is the share of descendants of Europeans, 
in line with Putterman and Weil (2010). The argument follows Acemoglu et al.’s (2001) line of 
reasoning. Europeans who settled in regions with a favorable biogeographic environment 
developed a good institutional framework, whereas European settlers in an unfavorable 
biogeographic environment implemented bad and extractive institutions. Therefore, the share of 
European descendants is likely to determine the quality of institutions. We apply standard over-
identification tests and find that the excluded instruments are independent of the error process. 
Regarding the subjective measure of institutions, the first instrument that we retain is the 
number of years elapsed since the adoption of agriculture, in line with Putterman and Weill (2010). 
Following Putterman (2008), we argue that the timing of transitions to agriculture influences the 
capacity of communities to organize as states and to invent good institutional models, through the 
accumulation of “statehood experience.” We also consider the percentage of land area in temperate 
zones as instrument. Rodrik et al. (2004) show that geographic endowments such as temperate 
versus tropical location determine the quality of institutions but do not affect economic output 
directly. Table 4 presents the results of the first-stage IV regression. All our instruments have F-
statistics above ten and successfully pass the Stock and Yogo’s (2005) Wald test criteria at the 5% 
level. 
Table 4. IV (LIML) first-stage regression for various measures of institutions. 
 
First-stage regression of institutions on instrumental variables 
 (1) (2) (3) 









Instrumental variables  
 
 
Share of descendants of Europeans 0.257*** 2.159***  
 (0.053) (0.584)  
Land area, in square km (x10-5) -3.370** -16.5***  
 (1.420) (3.910)  
Years since adoption of agriculture (x10-4)   -0.936*** 
   (0.210) 
% land area temperate zones   0.539*** 
   (0.148) 
    
Observations 79 78 75 
First-stage F-statistic 15.147 13.374 11.959 
Stock and Yogo (2005) Wald test criteria at 5% 8.680 8.680 8.680 
Over-identification test p-value 0.161 0.463 0.579 
 
  
To strengthen our case further, we implement the limited information maximum likelihood 
(LIML) estimation method, which has a lower bias and lower mean square error than the two-stage 
least squares method if the sample is small (Stock and Yogo, 2005).  
The results shown in panel A of Table 5 indicate a strong and significant influence of 
institutions on tail risk. All measures of institutional quality display a negative significant 
coefficient at the one-percent level. The marginal effect of institutions on tail risk is very important. 
For instance, we find that if a country such as Columbia (25th percentile) were to increase its 
government effectiveness index to the level of Chile (75th percentile), it would reduce by 69% the 
risk of daily drawdowns of 5% or more.  
Table 5. IV (LIML) cross-sectional regression on economic, financial, and institutional variables. 
This table shows the results of the second-stage regression for various measures of institutions. The dependent 
variable is the tail risk of returns in Panel A and the volatility in Panel B. The explanatory variables are the 
economic, financial and institutional variables. Tail risk is defined as the negative of the tail index of returns. The 
specifications include a constant not reported in the table. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All variables are defined in the appendix. 
      
 
Panel A:  
dependent variable is tail risk 
Panel B: 
dependent variable is volatility 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Economic and financial variables       
Log GDP per capita -0.001 -0.023 0.032 0.002** 0.001 0.002** 
 (0.027) (0.022) (0.029) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log trade to GDP 0.033 0.011 0.108** 0.001 0.001 0.003* 
 (0.034) (0.036) (0.041) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Financial openness 0.016 0.034* 0.037** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log number of listed stocks -0.032* -0.003 -0.022 0.001 0.001* 0.001 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.016) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log stock turnover 0.219* 0.263** 0.252** 0.008* 0.008* 0.008** 
 (0.115) (0.118) (0.109) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Log market capitalization to GDP 0.210* 0.230** 0.244** 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.113) (0.114) (0.108) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Log stocks traded to GDP -0.230** -0.287** -0.235** -0.006* -0.007* -0.006* 
 (0.108) (0.112) (0.099) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Objective institutional variables  
  
   
Postal service efficiency -0.414***   -0.012**   
 
(0.153)   (0.005)   
Executive constraints dummy  -0.069***   -0.001*  
 
 (0.020)   (0.001)  
Subjective institutional variables       
Government effectiveness KKM   -0.228***   -0.005** 
   (0.061)   (0.002) 
Observations 79 78 75 79 78 75 
R² 0.328 0.370 0.469 0.226 0.163 0.369 
Wald χ²  54.79 59.53 67.94 32.27 28.76 34.80 
 
  
Panel B of Table 5 investigates the relation between institutions and the volatility as 
dependent variable. The coefficient of regression of institutional variables is significantly negative, 
but only at the five or ten percent level.  We find that if a country such as Columbia (25th 
percentile) were to increase its government effectiveness index to the level of Chile (75th 
percentile), it would reduce the daily volatility by 44%.  
When looking at the Chi square statistics, we find that the goodness of fit of tail risk models 
(Panel A) is two times larger than those of volatility models (Panel B). Overall, these results show 
that institutions are an important determinant of risk across countries. This could explain why 
Ghysels et al. (2016), who do not consider institutional quality among the possible explaining 
variables, find low explanatory power in their cross-country regression of conditional skewness. 
 
3.3. Robustness checks 
In our base model, we exclude the tail index estimates that are beyond the range usually 
documented in the literature and retain the McCulloch estimates above one. We test the robustness 
of our results by taking two alternative samples. First, we use the full sample without excluding 
any tail index estimate. Second, because our initial sample includes frontier and small emerging 
markets, our results could be driven by infrequent trading. To address this issue, we also use a 
sample that excludes the first quartile of countries with the lowest stock turnover. The results of 
these robustness checks are similar to those presented in the previous sections and available on 
request. 
4. Conclusion 
This paper examines the link between stock market risk and institutional quality, an 
unresolved issue in the finance and economics literature. We find that volatility and tail risk are 
uncorrelated in the cross-section. We find a strong empirical relation between tail risk and the 
quality of institutions even after accounting for economic and financial variables. Overall, it seems 
that the institutional quality of country is a structural determinant of its tail risk. Conversely, we 
find a weaker association between institutional quality and volatility.  It appears that institutional 
quality affects risk more through persistent tail risk and less through time-varying volatility. This 
may help to explain the conflicting results in the existing literature that uses volatility-based 
measures of risk.  
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